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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 940574-CA 
v. : Priority No. 2 
WALLACE DAVIS, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Should this Court limit the scope of its ruling to 
indicate that it resolves the narrow issue of whether the 
forfeiture of a conveyance pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
13(1)(e) (1994) amounts to punishment for double jeopardy 
purposes in cases where the defendant was merely in "simple 
possession" of a controlled substance? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The language of any provisions, statutes or rules upon 
which the State relies is included in the body of this petition. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS 
For purposes of this petition, this Court's statement 
of the case and facts is sufficient. See State v. Davis. 273 
Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah App. 1995). (A copy of this Court's 
opinion is attached hereto as addendum A.) 
ARGUMENT 
THE STATE URGES THIS COURT TO EXPRESSLY LIMIT 
THE SCOPE OF ITS OPINION TO THOSE CASES 
INVOLVING FORFEITURE OF CONVEYANCES BASED ON 
A PERSON'S BEING IN "SIMPLE POSSESSION" OF A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE 
In footnote 13 of its opinion, this Court indicated the 
following: 
We note that this holding is limited to the 
narrow issue before us: whether the 
forfeiture of a conveyance pursuant to § 58-
37-13(1) (e) amounts to punishment for double 
jeopardy purposes. We do not reach the issue 
of whether the forfeiture of property of a 
different character, such as criminal 
proceeds, or of a privilege, such as 
operating a motor vehicle, constitutes 
punishment for double jeopardy purposes. 
Davis, 273 Utah Adv. Rep. at 14 n.13 (emphasis added). 
At oral argument, the State asked this Court to limit 
the scope of its ruling to make clear that the issues of whether 
the forfeiture of instrumentalities of a crime, forfeiture of 
criminal proceeds, and revocation of privileges voluntarily 
granted by the State constitute punishment for double jeopardy 
purposes remained open under its opinion. Based on the content 
and thrust of footnote 13, it appears the Court intended to limit 
the scope of its ruling as the State had requested. 
Section 58-37-13(1) (e), however, speaks in broad terms. 
It provides for the forfeiture of conveyances "used or intended 
for use, to transport, or in any manner facilitate the 
transportation, sale, receipt, [or] simple possession [of a 
controlled substance] .If Conveyances used to facilitate the sale 
of a controlled substance are of a "different character" than the 
2 
vehicle that was forfeited in the instant case because such 
conveyances may be properly treated as an instrumentality of a 
crime. Because the State believes this Court intended to 
withhold judgment on the issue of whether the forfeiture of such 
property constitutes punishment for double jeopardy purposes 
until that issue is squarely presented to the Court, the State 
asks this Court to modify its opinion accordingly. Specifically, 
the State asks the Court to amend its opinion to indicate that 
its holding is limited to the narrow issue of whether the 
forfeiture of a conveyance pursuant to § 58-37-13(1)(e) for cases 
involving the simple possession of controlled substances amounts 
to punishment for double jeopardy purposes. 
CONCLUSION 
The State respectfully asks that this Court narrow the 
scope of its holding to indicate that it resolves the narrow 
issue of whether the forfeiture of a conveyance pursuant to § 58-
37-13 (1) (e) based on the simple possession of a controlled 
substance amounts to punishment for double jeopardy purposes. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this vj*^day of October, 1995. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
TODD A. UTZINGER 
Assistant Attorney General 
Criminal Appeals Division 
3 
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Court of Appeals' Opinion In 
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EN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Wallace DAVIS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 940574-CA 
FILED: September 21, 1995 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick 
ATTORNEYS: 
G. Fred Metos, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Todd A. Utzinger and Jan Graham, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Onne, Davis, and Bench. 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
DAMS, Associate Presiding Judge: 
Defendant Wallace Davis pursues this 
interlocutory appeal from the trial court's denial 
of his motion to dismiss the charge of unlawful 
possession of a controlled substance, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1994). The premise of 
defendant's interlocutory appeal is that he was 
previously subjected to a trial regarding the 
forfeiture of his vehicle, the basis of which was 
the same offense alleged in the criminal 
information. Therefore, if defendant were 
compelled to stand trial on the criminal charges, 
it would amount to a second punishment, which 
is prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Article I, section 12 of the 
Utah Constitution. We reverse. 
FACTS 
The facts are not in dispute. On January 13, 
1994, defendant was stopped by a West Valley 
City police officer for a. motor vehicle license 
violation. While performing a routine check, the 
officer discovered defendant had outstanding 
warrants and, therefore, placed him under 
arrest. As a result of the arrest, defendant's 
vehicle was impounded and searched. The 
search uncovered one-quarter gram of cocaine, 
which had a value of approximately $25. 
Defendant's vehicle was ultimately seized and 
held for forfeiture pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§58-37-13(l)(e) (1994).1 Defendant filed a 
claim, seeking the vehicle's return. At the 
forfeiture trial held May 11, 1994, the trial 
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court ordered the vehicle forfeited, concludin 
that the forfeiture was not violative of th 
Excessive Fines Clause2 of the Eight 
Amendment to the Federal Constitution. 
The criminal information was filed on Apr. 
12, 1994. Defendant moved to dismiss th 
criminal charges, claiming that any furthe 
prosecution would violate the Double Jeopard 
Clause of both the United States and Uta 
Constitutions. The trial court denied defendant 
motion, concluding the forfeiture penalty is n< 
so "disproportionate to the cost of investigatin 
and prosecuting the defendant that it constitute 
'punishment' rather than 'rough reinedi; 
justice'" and thus "does not violate the doubl 
jeopardy provisions of the United States or Uta 
constitutions," citing United Stares v. Halpei 
490 U.S. 435, 109 S. Ct. 1892 (1989).3 
Defendant filed a petition in this cou 
requesting permission to file an interlocutoi 
appeal based on the trial court's denial c 
defendant's motion to dismiss.4 We grante 
defendant's petition. 
ISSUES 
The narrow issues on appeal are (1) whetht 
the forfeiture proceedings and the crimin 
proceedings in the case at bar are separate an< 
if so, (2) whether a civil in rem forfeitu 
proceeding constitutes a punishment whic 
would preclude a second punishment in 
criminal proceeding under the Double Jeoparc 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Unite 
States Constitution.5 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
We are charged with reviewing the correctne 
of the trial court's decision to deny defendant 
motion to dismiss. In doing so, we mu 
determine whether the trial court correct 
interpreted the Federal Constitutio 
Constitutional interpretation is a question of la 
which we review for correctness, giving I 
deference to the trial court's conclusion. State 
Contrel. 886 P.2d 107, 111 (Utah App. 1994 
cert, denied, No. 950059 (Utah May 9, 1995 
See also Financial Bancorp, Inc. v. Pingree 
Dahle, Inc., 880 P.2d 14, 16 (Utah App. 1994 
ANALYSIS 
It is well established that the Fif 
Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause protec 
a defendant from three abuses: "a secoi 
prosecution for the same offense after acquire 
a second prosecution for the same offense aft 
conviction; and multiple punishments for t 
same offense." United States v. Halper, 4' 
U.S. 435, 440, 109 S. Ct. 1892, 1897 (198< 
It is the third abuse, multiple punishments f 
the same offense, which is at issue hei 
Although the government may impose multip 
punishments against a defendant in the sar 
proceeding, it may not do so in two or mo 
separate proceedings. United States 
$405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 121 
1215 (9th Cir. 1994), amended by 56 F.3d • 
ZE REPORTS 
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(9th Cir. 1995). Thus, we must address two 
questions: (1) Is the forfeiture proceeding 
separate from the criminal prosecution?; and, if 
so, (2) Does the forfeiture in this case amount to 
a punishment for double jeopardy purposes? 
Separate Proceedings 
Because the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits 
punishing a defendant more than once in 
separate proceedings, we must first determine 
whether the forfeiture proceedings in this case 
are separate from the criminal proceedings 
initiated against defendant. 
The federal circuit courts have approached this 
issue differently. The Seventh and Ninth Circuits | 
have concluded that civil forfeiture proceedings 
are separate from criminal proceedings. United 
States v. Torres, 28 F.3d 1463, 1465 (7th Cir.), 
cert, denied, __U.S . _ , 115 S. Ct. 669 (1994); 
United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 
F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir. 1994). In 
$405,089.23 U.S. Currency, the government 
was seeking not only criminal penalties against 
the defendant, but was also pursuing civil 
forfeiture remedies. The different actions were 
instituted at roughly the same time, but the 
forfeiture proceedings were before a different 
judge and were not concluded until over a year 
after the criminal convictions. Additionally, the 
forfeiture complaint was based on exactly the 
same offenses giving rise to the criminal 
prosecution. "[T]he only difference between the 
two proceedings was the remedy sought by the 
government." 33 F.3d at 1216. 
The issue before the court was parallel to the 
issue before this court: Whether the second 
proceeding was a violation of the defendant's 
Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy rights. In 
concluding that the criminal action and the 
forfeiture action were separate proceedings for 
double jeopardy purposes, the court staled: 
We fail to see how two separate actions, one 
civil and one criminal, instituted at different 
times, tried at different times before 
different factfinders, presided over by 
different district judges, and resolved by 
separate judgments, constitute the same 
"proceeding." In ordinary legal parlance, 
such actions are often characterized as 
"parallel proceedings," but not as the "same 
proceeding." A forfeiture case and a 
criminal prosecution would constitute the 
same proceeding only if they were brought 
in the same indictment and tried at the same 
time. 
Id. Moreover, although both proceedings 
resulted from the same violation of the law, the 
court stated, "We are not willing to whitewash 
the double jeopardy violation in this case by 
affording constitutional significance to the label 
of 'single, coordinated prosecution/" Id. at 
1217. See also Torres, 28 F.3d at 1465 ("Two 
trials, even if close in time, are still double 
jeopardy."); United States v. Stanwood, 872 F. 
Supp. 791 (D. Or. 1994); United States v. 
McCaslin, 863 F. Supp. 1299 (W.D. Wash. I 
UTAH AD VAN 
1994).6 
The Second and Eleventh Circuits, on the 
other hand, have concluded that a civil forfeiture 
proceeding and a parallel criminal action can 
constitute a single proceeding against the 
defendant. See United States v. 18775 North Ba\ 
Road, Miami, 13 F.3d 1493, 1499 (11th Cir'. 
1994); United States v. Millan, 2 F.3d 17, 20 
(2nd Cir. 1993), cert, denied, _ U.S. _ , 114 
S. Ct. 922 (1994). In Teaching its decision in 
Millan, the court relied on the following: (1) the 
"warrants for the civil seizures and criminal 
arrests were issued on the same day, by the 
same judge, based on the same affidavit!;]" (2) 
a stipulation entered into by the government and 
the defendants included both the property in the 
civil forfeiture and the property in the criminal 
indictment; (3) the civil complaint 
cross-referenced and incorporated the criminal 
indictment; and (4) the defendants knew at the 
time they agreed to the stipulation that there 
were criminal charges pending. 2 F.3d at 20. 
The court determined that the fact that the 
civil forfeiture and the criminal action were filed 
separately was of no relevance; noting that in 
the federal system, civil and criminal actions 
were required to be filed separately. Id. 
"Therefore, courts must look past the procedural 
requirements and examine the essence of the 
actions at hand by determining when, how, and 
why the civil and criminal actions were 
initiated." Id. Thus, the court determined that 
the actions were the result of a single 
coordinated effort against the defendants and 
therefore were a single coordinated prosecution, 
thereby avoiding double jeopardy issues. But see 
United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568, 575 (6th 
Cir. 1995) (stating that merely labeling 
something as a "'single, coordinated proceeding' 
. . . does not make it so"). 
The apparent inconsistencies between the 
Ninth and Second Circuits' approaches may 
depend more upon factual and procedural 
differences in the cases than fundamental 
differences in a double jeopardy analysis. The 
Nmth Circuit approach is more mechanical and 
literal, providing a more practical and utilitarian 
methodology of avoiding potential double 
jeopardy challenges. The Second Circuit 
approach, on the other hand, focuses upon a 
more detailed analysis of the synchronization of 
the two proceedings, together with the 
defendant's involvement at various stages cf 
those proceedings, to determine whether the 
defendant has been twice placed in jeopardy. 
Thus, parallel proceedings which are literally 
separate, may, under certain circumstances, not 
be separate for double jeopardy purposes.7 
In the case at bar, the State has brought and 
tried the civil forfeiture proceeding separately 
from the criminal prosecution. The actions were 
initiated separately and the State seeks to try the 
actions at different times before different judges, 
which will result in separate judgments against 
defendant. Warrants were not issued on the 
same day by the same judge based on the same 
:E REPORTS 
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affidavit for either the civil forfeiture or the 
criminal action. There was no stipulation entered 
into by defendant which referenced property 
contained in both the civil and criminal action, 
and the civil forfeiture complaint did not 
incorporate the criminal information. The only 
coinciding factor between the two cases is that 
they are based on the same offense. This alone 
is insufficient to support a determination that the 
proceedings are the same, even under the 
Second Circuit's analysis. Under the Ninth 
Circuit's analysis, the proceedings herein were 
clearly separate because "[a] forfeiture case and 
a criminal prosecution would constitute the same 
proceeding only if they were brought . . . and 
tried at the same time." $405,089.23 U.S. 
Currency, 33 F.3d at 1216. Accordingly, under 
either analysis, the proceedings in the case at 
bar are separate for double jeopardy purposes.8 
Punishment 
Because we have concluded that the 
proceedings in the case at bar are separate, we 
must next determine whether the forfeiture of 
defendant's vehicle is punishment for double 
jeopardy purposes. The State asserts, and the 
trial court agreed, that the forfeiture of 
defendant's vehicle did not constitute punishment 
because the value of the vehicle was not 
disproportionate to the cost of prosecuting 
defendant. Defendant claims that when 
determining whether a forfeiture is punitive in 
nature, we should look to the forfeiture statute 
itself to determine whether any purpose of the 
statute or result of its application is to punish the 
offender. Although the forfeiture statute may be 
deemed to serve some remedial objective, such 
as reimbursing the government for the cost of 
prosecution, defendant argues that if it cannot be 
interpreted as solely remedial, but can also be 
said to act as a deterrent or serve some other 
punitive purpose, then it must be considered 
punishment for double jeopardy purposes. 
The issue of whether a civil in rem forfeiture 
conducted pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§58-37-13 (1994) constitutes punishment has 
been recently addressed by the Utah Supreme 
Court. In State v. 392 South 600 East, Nephi, 
Utah, 886 P.2d 534 (1994), the court concluded 
that section 58-37-13(l)(i) "is punitive, at least 
in part."9 Id. at 541. The basis for the court's 
decision paralleled that of Austin v. United 
States, _ V.S. _ , 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993). 
In Austin, the petitioner was indicted on four 
counts of violating South Dakota's drug laws 
and ultimately pled guilty to only one count; he 
was subsequently sentenced to a seven-year 
prison term by the state court. After the 
petitioner'8 indictment, the federal government 
instituted in rem proceedings in the federal 
district court pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §§881(a)(4) 
and (a)(7),10 seeking forfeiture of the petitioner's 
mobile home and auto body shop. In granting 
summary judgment in favor of the government, 
the district court rejected the petitioner's Eighth 
Amendment excessive fines argument. The 
summary judgment was upheld on appeal to the 
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. The case was 
then taken before the United States Supreme 
Court. 
In concluding that a forfeiture pursuant to 21 
U.S.C. §881 (a)(4) and (a)(7) amounted to 
punishment, the Supreme Court focused on: (1) 
the historical significance of the fact that civil in 
rem forfeitures were always understood to be 
punitive in nature; (2) the innocent owner 
defense afforded the property's owner under 
section 881(a)(4) and (a)(7); (3) the fact that 
forfeitures under section 881 are strictly 
associated with drug violations; and (4) the 
legislative history of section 881.n Austin, 113 
S. Ct. at 2810-11. The government's arguments 
that the statute was remedial in nature because it 
"remove[s] the 'instruments' of the drug trade 
'thereby protecting the community from the 
threat of continued drug dealing,'" id. at 2811 
(quoting Brief for United States at 32), and 
because it reimburses the government for the 
expense of law enforcement and "societal 
problems such as urban blight, drug addiction, 
and other health concerns resulting from the 
drug trade" were clearly rejected. Id. The Court 
reasoned the petitioner's mobile home and auto 
body shop could hardly be considered 
instruments of the drug trade and "'[t]here is 
nothing even remotely criminal in possessing'" 
the properties at issue. Id. (citation omitted). 
Furthermore, because "'forfeiture of property . 
. . [is] a penalty that ha[s] absolutely no 
correlation to any damages sustained by society 
or to the cost of enforcing the law[,]'" id. at 
2812 (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 
242, 254, 100 S. Ct. 2636, 2644 (1980)), the 
government's claim that forfeitures under section 
881 were a "'reasonable form of liquidated 
damages'" was also rejected, id. at 2811 
(quoting One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United 
States, 409 U.S. 232, 237, 93 S. Ct. 489, 493 
(1972)). 
Even if section 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) were 
remedial in part, the Court opined, they would 
still conclude that the forfeiture was punitive 
because "4a civil sanction that cannot fairly be 
said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but 
rather can only be explained as also serving 
either retributive or deterrent purposes, is 
punishment, as we have come to understand the 
term.'" Id. at 2812 (quoting United States v. 
Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448, 109 S. Ct. 1892, 
1902 (1989) (eniphasis ad<ied)). Thus, even if a 
statute is remedial in part, if it has any punitive 
attributes, constitutional protections attach. Id. 
Because the Court found that forfeiture pursuant 
to section 881(a)(4) and' (a)(7) amounted to 
punishment, the constraints of the Eighth 
Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause applied. 
The State attempts to distinguish the holding in 
Austin on two grounds: (1) Austin misinterprets 
and therefore misapplies the test for punishment 
set forth in Halper and extracts a "rule" from 
Halper which is merely dicta; and (2) Austin 
applies only in the Eighth Amendment context. 
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However, the State's reasoning is flawed for 
several reasons. 
The State asks this court to ignore the test for 
punishment announced in Halper, 490 U.S. at 
448, 109 S. Ct. at 1902, and underscored in 
Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812, claiming that the 
language is merely dicta. Although there may 
have been some confusion created by the holding 
in Halper, Austin has clarified any 
misunderstanding. 
In Halper, the defendant was criminally 
convicted of violating the federal criminal 
false-claims statute when be submitted sixty-five 
false claims for Medicare benefits 
reimbursement, amounting to S585. Based on 
the facts established by the criminal conviction, 
the government attempted to collect a civil 
penalty for the crime pursuant to the False 
Claims Act (the Act), which provided for a civil 
penalty in the amount of $2000 per false claim, 
for a total of $130,000, plus the costs of 
prosecution and twice the amount of the actual 
damages. The United States District Court for 
the Southern District of New York, however, 
concluded that the civil penalty under the Act 
would amount to a second punishment, 
considering the disproportionality of the penalty 
to the actual costs to the government, and held 
it violative of the Double Jeopardy Clause. On 
appeal, the United States Supreme Court 
addressed the issue of "whether and under what 
circumstances a civil penalty may constitute 
'punishment' for the purposes of double 
jeopardy analysis." Halper, 490 U.S. at 436, 
109 S. Ct. at 1895. 
The Court declined to base its decision on the 
statutory language of the Act, concluding that a 
statutory construction analysis "is not well suited 
to the context of the * humane interests' 
safeguarded by the Double Jeopardy Clause's 
proscription of multiple punishments." Id. at 
447, 109 S. Ct. at 1901. Instead, "the 
determination whether a given civil sanction 
constitutes punishment in the relevant sense 
requires a particularized assessment of the 
penalty imposed and the purposes that the 
penalty may fairly be said to serve."i2 Id. at 
448, 109 S. Ct. at 1901. 
A definition of punishment was set forth by 
the Court which may have led to the existing 
confusion: 
IAJ civil sanction that cannot fairly be said 
solely to strvt a remedial purpose, but 
rather can only be explained as also serving 
either retributive or deterrent purposes, is 
punishment, as we have come to understand 
the term. [Citation omitted.] We therefore 
hold that under the Double Jeopard} Clause 
a defendant who already has been punished 
in a criminal prosecution may not be 
subjected to an additional civil sanction to 
the extent that the second sanction may not 
fairly be characterized as remedial, but only 
as a deterrent or retribution. 
Id. at 448^9 , 109 S. Ct. at 1902. The State 
correctly observes that the above quoted 
sentences seem to conflict with each other. In 
the first instance, the Court states that a civil 
sanction is punishment if it is not solely 
remedial, but is also retributive or deterring in 
nature. The second sentence states that if a civil 
sanction cannot be identified as remedial, but 
only as deterring or retributive in nature, then it 
is punishment. The State claims that the 
difference between the two is of great 
importance, and that the second sentence is the 
"true" test for determining whether a civil 
sanction is punishment. 
We need not resolve this issue because Austin 
clarifies any potential confusion created b> 
Halper when it, again, defines punishment for a 
constitutional protection analysis by focusing on 
the first sentence of the Halper definition. Austin 
states that 
[w]e need not exclude the possibility that a 
forfeiture serves remedial purposes to 
conclude that it is subject to the limitations 
of the Excessive Fines Clause. We, 
however, must determine that it can only be 
explained as serving in part to punish. We 
said in Halper that "a civil sanction that 
cannot fairly be said solely to serve a 
remedial purpose, but rather can only be 
explained as also serving either retributive 
or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we 
have come to understand the term." Halper, 
490 U.S. at 448, 109 S. Ct. at 1902. 
Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2806 (emphasis added). 
Furthermore, because the statute in Austin could 
not be fairly assessed as serving solely a 
remedial function, it was considered punishment 
for constitutional purposes. Id. at 2812. Thus, 
Austin distinctly emphasizes that even if criminal 
fines, civil penalties, or civil forfeitures have 
remedial purposes, if they have any punitive 
objectives, they are subject to constitutional 
constraints. Id. 
Austin's interpretation of punishment flows 
logically when considered in the double jeopardy 
context. As the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
stated: 
fTJhat a sanction should be considered 
punishment if it is not solely remedial is 
supported by common sense. That is to say, 
if a particular remedial sanction can only be 
understood as also serving punitive goals, 
then the person subjected to the sanction has 
been punished despite the fact that the 
sanction is also remedial. To conclude 
otherwise effectively invalidates the Double 
Jeopardy Cuius e by allowing multiple 
punishments for the same conduct merely 
because the punishments also serve remedial 
purposes. 
United States v. Hudson, 14 F.3d 536, 540 
(10th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added). 
Accordingly, we reject the State's contention 
that Austin misinterpreted the test for 
punishment set forth in Halper. 
The State also claims the analysis in Austin 
does not apply to the Fifth Amendment Double 
Jeopardy Clause because the holding defines 
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punishment for Eighth Amendment Excessive 
Fines purposes only. We disagree. In 
determining whether the Eighth Amendment 
protections applied, the Austin court undertook 
a punishment analysis first, and only then did it 
determine that Eighth Amendment protections 
applied. Furthermore, Austin used the "solely 
remedial" portion of the test employed by 
Halper, a double jeopardy case, in determining 
whether section 881 constituted punishment for 
Eighth Amendment purposes. Austin, 113 S. Ct 
at 2812. Thus, the same analysis for punishment 
is undertaken whether a defendant is seeking 
protection under the Eighth Amendment's 
Excessive Fines Clause or the Fifth 
Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause. See 
United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 
F.3d 1210, 1219 n.8 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating, 
"the answer to the question whether a particular 
forfeiture constitutes punishment will always be 
the same for purposes of the Double Jeopardy 
Clause and the Eighth Amendment"): cf. 
Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, U.S. 
_ , 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1945 (1994) (stating civil 
penalties and civil forfeitures are "subject to 
constitutional constraints"). 
Notwithstanding the State's position that the 
holding m Austin is not applicable to the case at 
hand, the Utah Supreme Court was "persuaded 
that the analysis m Austin applies equally to 
section 58-37-13(l)(i)." 392 South 600 East, 
Nephi, Utah, 886 P.2d at 540. In 392 South 600 
East, the defendant was arrested after he 
purchased marijuana at his own residence from 
an informant for the Juab County Sheriffs 
office, and the State subsequently instituted 
forfeiture proceedings against the defendant's 
residence and real property under section 
58-37-13(l)(i). The defendant resisted, claiming 
that the forfeiture violated the Eighth 
Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause. 
After explaining Austin in detail, the court 
applied the same analysis to the issue before it. 
The Utah Supreme Court reiterated that 
forfeiture statutes in general have always been 
punitive in nature, and recognized that, 
analogous to section 881(a)(4) and (a)(7), section 
58-37-13(l)(i) has an innocent-owner defense. 
Therefore, based on these two factors and the 
fact that the United States Supreme Court 
rejected the claim "that forfeiture is a reasonable 
liquidated compensation to the state," the court 
concluded that section 58-37-13(1 )(i) "is 
punitive, at least in part." Id. at 541. Because 
forfeiting property pursuant to section 
58-37-13(l)(i) is considered a punishment, the 
court held that the Eighth Amendment's 
Excessive Fines Clause applied. Id. 
Although the forfeiture proceedings in 392 
South 600 East were brought pursuant to 
subsection (l)(i) of section 58-37-13, the same 
analysts is applicable to subsection (l)(e), which 
is at issue here. Section 58-37-13(l)(e) provides 
for the forfeiture of a conveyance when it is 
used in connection with illegal controlled 
substances. Thus, subsection (\)(t) is a civil in 
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rem forfeiture statute which has historically been 
understood to constitute punishment. See State v. 
One 1983 Pontiac (Joe Arave), 111 P.2d 1338, 
1340 (Utah 1986) ("We affirm that the major 
thrust of [Utah Code Ann. §58-37-13] is to 
strike at those involved in the trafficking of 
drugs"); State v. $9,199.00 U.S. Currency, 791 
P.2d 213, 215 (Utah App. 1990) (same). Like 
subsection (l)(i), subsection (l)(e) contains an 
innocent owner defense. Thus, because the claim 
that forfeiture constitutes nothing more than 
liquidated damages to reimburse the state for the 
cost of prosecution has already been repudiated, 
it is clear that a forfeiture under section 
58-37-13(l)(e) constitutes punishment.13 
Furthermore, even though 392 South 600 East 
was an Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines 
case, with respect to determining whether 
forfeiture constitutes punishment, we hold that it 
makes no difference whether the analysis applies 
to the Fifth or Eighth Amendment, even though 
the end result may be different because of other 
aspects of a given case.14 Accordingly, the 
constitutional protections afforded by the Fifth 
Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause apply.15 
The State claims that the forfeiture in this case 
is constitutional because the value of the vehicle 
(between $2925 and $4600) was rationally 
related to the cost to prosecute defendant in both 
the forfeiture action and the criminal 
proceedings. Because the value of the forfeiture 
is not "so disproportionate to the damages 
caused," Halper, 490 U.S. at 450, 109 S. Ct. at 
1903, the State asserts it should not constitute 
punishment. This approach was explicitly 
rejected in Austin, which recognized that Halper 
"focused on whether 'the sanction as applied in 
the individual case serves the goals of 
punishment/" but stated "(i]n this case, 
however, it makes sense to focus on §§881 (a)(4) 
and (a)(7) as a whole." Austin. 113 S. Ct. at 
2812 n.14 (citation omitted). Austin 
distinguished the civil sanction at issue in Halper 
from the forfeiture issue before it: 
Halper involved a small, fixed penalty 
provision, which "in the ordinary case . . . 
can be said to do no more than make the 
Government whole." [Citation omitted.] The 
value of conveyances and real property 
forfeitable under §§881(a)(4) and (a)(7), on 
the other hand, can vary so dramatically that 
any relationship between the Government's 
actual costs and the amount of the sanction 
is merely coincidental. 
Id. Thus, when addressing civil forfeitures, 
Austin concludes that the cost of prosecution 
compared to the value of the forfeiture is 
irrelevant. 
We follow the rationale set out in Austin and 
reject the "disproportionality" test as advanced 
by the State. As identified in Austin, utilizing a 
"disproportionality" test when addressing 
forfeiture creates inconsistent results and further 
complicates criminal proceedings. The public 
interest is best served when a potential defendant 
is put on notice of what his or her conceivable 
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punishment is for his or her crime. 
Furthermore, by looking solely to the purpose 
behind the forfeiture statute as opposed to 
comparing the cost of prosecution to the value of 
the forfeited conveyance on a case by case basis, 
the necessity of extensive fact finding is 
eliminated. The interests of the public are also 
served by analyzing the nature of the statute to 
determine whether it is solely remedial or partly 
punitive as well as providing a utilitarian 
framework within which to pursue criminal 
defendants, eliminating the speculative nature of 
the "disproporiionaljty" test. 
Moreover, the disproportionaliry test would 
frequently result in an unacceptable inequality of 
treatment. Forfeiture of an essentially valueless 
automobile would not constitute punishment 
because its value would not exceed the costs of 
prosecution; forfeiture of a valuable automobile 
would constitute punishment in the many 
situations where the vehicle's value greatly 
exceeded the cost of prosecution. But the poor 
person's loss of his only "wheels" may actually 
work much more of a hardship than the wealthy 
person's loss of a luxury automobile. Surely the 
availability of important constitutional 
protections cannot turn on such vagaries of 
economics. Cf. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812 n.14 
("[T]he value of the conveyances. . . forfeitable 
. . . can vary so dramatically that any 
relationship between the Government's actual 
costs and the amount of the sanction is merely 
coincidental."). 
CONCLUSION 
We hold that the concluded forfeiture action 
and the pending criminal proceeding are separate 
proceedings for double jeopardy purposes and 
that a forfeiture pursuant to section 58-37-13 
constitutes punishment. By pursuing the criminal 
proceedings against defendant, the State is 
attempting to punish defendant a second time for 
an offense for which he has already been 
punished, the very abuse that the Double 
Jeopardy Clause protects against. Therefore, we 
conclude thai the subsequent criminal proceeding 
is barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment. Accordingly, the trial court's 
order denying defendant's motion to dismiss is 
reversed.'6 
James Z. Davis. Associate Presiding Judge 
I CONCUR: 
Gregory K. Orme, Presiding Judge 
1. Utah Code Ann. §58-37-13 (1994), in pertinent 
part, provides: 
(1) The following are subject to forfeiture and no 
property right exists in them: 
(e) all conveyances including aircraft, vehicles, 
or vessels used or intended for use, to transport, 
or in any manner facilitate the transportation, 
sale, receipt, simple possession, or concealment 
of property described in Subsections (l)(a) and 
(l)(b), except that: 
(ii) a conveyance may not be forfeited under 
this section by reason of any act or omission 
committed or omitted without the owner*s 
knowledge or consent . . . . 
(9) . . . (h) Proceedings of this section arc 
independent of any other proceedings, whether 
civil or criminal, under this chapter or the laws 
of this state. 
Id. 
2. The Excessive Fines Clause provides that 
unreasonable fines shall not be imposed. Thus, 
defendant argued the forfeiture of his vehicle was 
excessive when considered in light of his crime 
Defendant did not appeal the forfeiture judgment. 
3 . The "blue book" value of the vehicle was between 
$2925 and $4600. The parties have stipulated that the 
cost to prosecute both the forfeiture case and the 
pending criminal case is approximately $2500. 
4. The State has stipulated to defendant's request for 
interlocutory review. 
5. Defendant also advances a state constitutional 
analysis, claiming the Double Jeopardy Clause of the 
Utah Constitution should be interpreted differently 
than the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause. 
Defendant claims this court "should hold that in rem 
forfeiture constitutes punishment" and that "in rem 
forfeiture constitutes a separate proceeding" for 
purposes of our state constitution's Double Jeopardy 
Clause. However, "[a]s a general rule, we will not 
engage in state constitutional analysis unless an 
argument for different analyses under the state and 
federal constitutions is briefed." State v. Lqfferry, 749 
P.2d 1239, 1247 n.5 (Utah 1988) (emphasis added). 
cert, denied, 504 U.S. 911, 112 S. Ct. 1942 (1992). 
Accord State v. Shilling, 770 P.2d 137, 142 n.26 
(Utah 1989). Defendant is essentially asking this court 
to interpret the Double Jeopardy Clause under our 
state constitution in the same manner as the Double 
Jeopardy Clause under the Federal Constitution. 
Hence, a state constitutional analysis is unnecessary 
and this court declines to undertake that task. 
6. The United States Supreme Court alludes to this 
issue in Department of Revenue v Kurth Ranch, 
U.S. __? 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994). In that case, the 
defendants were arrested and charged criminally for 
conspiracy to possess drugs with the intent to sell in 
violation of Montana law. In addition to the criminal 
charges, the State instituted both a civil forfeiture 
action to recover certain property used in defendants' 
drug operation and an administrative proceeding 
involving the assessment of a "drug tax" on the 
confiscated drugs. The dispositive issue in Kurth 
Ranch involved the States attempt to impose a tax on 
the drugs pursuant to its new Dangerous Drug Tax 
Act. The Court ultimately held that the tax was 
punishment for double jeopardy analysis. Id. at 1948. 
More importantly, the Court noted "the statute [does 
notj require us to comment on the permissibility of 
'multiple punishments' imposed in the same 
proceeding, since it involves separate sanctions 
imposed in successive proceedings * Id at 1947 n.21 
(citation omitted). Thus, the Court considered the 
cnminaj indictment and the tax assessment 
proceedings to be separate proceedings, even though 
they arose out of the same offense and were the result 
of a single coordinated effort by the government to 
cease the defendants drug operation. Even though the 
language in Kurth Ranch is dicta, it is instructive for 
our purposes. 
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7. The Sixth Circuit recently melded the Second and 
Ninth Circuits' analyses to hold that separate 
proceedings occurred where a civil forfeiture consent 
judgment was entered during the pendency of criminal 
proceedings. United States v. Urserx, 59 F.3d 568, 
575 (6th Cir. 1995). 
8. Not only does federal case law compel the 
conclusion that the proceedings in the case at bar are 
separate, but the forfeiture statute itself provides that 
"[proceedings of this section are independent of any 
other proceedings, whether civil or criminal, under 
this chapter or the laws of this state." Utah Code Ann. 
§58-37-13(9)(h) (1994). See also Utah Code Ann. 
§76-3-501 (6)(h) (1994) (providing vehicle is subject to 
forfeiture when used in the commission of a felony 
where a firearm is used and that any forfeiture 
proceedings are "independent of any other 
proceedings, whether civil or criminal"); Id. §58-37-
8(8)(a) ("Any penalty imposed for [the illegal 
possession of a controlled substance] is in addition to, 
and not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty 
or sanction authorized by law."). 
9. Utah Code Ann. §58-37-13(1)0)0994) provides 
for the forfeiture of 
all warehousing, housing, and storage facilities, 
or interest in real property of any kind used, or 
intended for use, in producing, cultivating, 
warehousing, storing, protecting, or 
manufacturing any controlled substances in 
violation of this chapter . . . . 
Id. 
10. 21 U.S.C.A. §881(a) provides for the forfeiture 
of: 
(4) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, 
or vessels, which are used, or are intended for 
use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate 
the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or 
concealment of [controlled substances) . . . . 
(7) All real property, including ?ny right, title. 
and interest (including any leasehold interest) in 
the whole of any lot or tract of land and any 
appurtenances or improvements, which is used, 
or intended to he used, in any manner or pan, to 
commit, or to facilitate the commission of, a 
violation of this subchapter punishable by more 
than one vear's imprisonment . . . 
21 U.S.C.A. §881 (West Supp. 1995). It should be 
noted that subsection (4) is essentially identical to 
Utah Code Ann. §58-37- 13(l)(e) (1994). which is at 
issue in this case 
11. Congress identified forfeiture as "'« powerful 
deterrent*" and stated that "'the traditional criminal 
sanctions of fines and imprisonment are inadequate to 
deter or punish the enormously profitable trade in 
dangerous drugs.*' Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2811 
(quotingS. Rep. No. 225 at 191, 195(1983)). 
12. The Court cautioned, however, that the analysis 
was not from the defendant's perspective because "for 
the defendant even remedial sanctions carry the sting 
of punishment." Halper, 490 U.S. at 447. 109 S Ct. 
at 1901 n.7. 
13. We note that this holding is limited to the narrow 
issue before us: whether the forfeiture of a 
conveyance pursuant to §58-37-13i 1 )(e) amounts to 
punishment for double jeopardy purposes We do not 
reach the issue of whether the forfeiture of property of 
a different character, such as criminal proceeds, or of 
a privilege, such as operating a motor vehicle, 
constitutes punishment for double jeopardy purposes. 
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14. As the Ninth Circuit properly stated: 
To make it clear, we hold only that because the 
method of determining whether the forfeiture 
constitutes punishment is identical, the answer to 
the question whether a particular forfeiture 
constitutes punishment will always be the same 
for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause and 
the Eighth Amendment. [However], [wjhether a 
violation of either clause exists involves factors 
that are different with respect to each clause. 
U.S. v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 
1219 n.8 (9th Cir. 1994). 
15. Most courts from other jurisdictions hold that the 
Austin analysis applies in the Fifth Amendment 
context. See People v. Towns, 646N.E.2d 1366, 1370 
(III. Ct. App. 1995) and cases cited therein; see also 
State v. 1979 Cadillac Deville, 632 So. 2d 1221, 1228 
(La. Ct. App. 2 Cir.), writ granted, 642 So. 2d 1302 
(La. 1994) ("Although not specifically deciding a 
double jeopardy claim in Austin, the Court's reasoning 
makes it clear that double jeopardy applies in 
[forfeiture cases]"). Contra State v. Johnson, 632 So. 
2d 817, 818 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.), writ granted. 
642 So. 2d 1302 (La. 1994) (rejecting Austin analysis 
for Halper "disproportionate" test—civil forfeiture not 
so disproportionate to government's damages to 
constitute punishment). See also Fant v. State, 881 
S.W.2d 830, 834 (Tex. Ct. App. 14th Dist. 1994) 
(holding prior civil forfeiture constitutes punishment 
under Double Jeopardy Clause so as to prohibit 
subsequent criminal proceedings), rejecting Johnson v. 
State, 882 S.W.2d 17, 20 (Tex. Ct. App 1st Dist. 
1994) (holding forfeiture did not implicate double 
jeopardy because it was not "'overwhelmingly 
disproportionate to the damages appellant caused'") 
(citation omitted); State v. Clark, 875 P.2d 613,617 
(Wash. 1994) (stating "the Austin Court's reasoning 
for deeming forfeiture 'punishment' for the purpose »•:" 
Eighth Amendment analysis extends to the Fifth 
Amendment as well"). 
16. We find nothing inherently unconstitutional about 
forfeiture and stress that double jeopardy is implicated 
only when remedies for criminal activity are sought in 
separate proceedings. To the extent that Utah Code 
Ann. §58-37-13(9)(h)(1994) may or may not impede 
the pursuit of remedies in the same actual proceeding, 
that is a matter that must be addressed by our 
legislature. 
BENCH, Judge (dissenting): 
I respectfully dissent. The main opinion errs 
by concluding, as a matter of law, that criminal 
prosecution of defendant would violate double 
jeopardy because defendant has already been 
subjected to the civil forfeiture provision of Utah 
Code Ann. §58-37-13 (1994). 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that no 
person shall "be subject for the same offence to 
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb|.]" 
Historically, this provision was interpreted to 
apply in cases where a person's life was at stake 
or to "offences which, in former ages, were 
punishable by dismemberment, and as intending 
to comprise the crimes denominated in the law. 
felonies." People v. Goodwin, 3 8 Johns. 187, 
201 (N.Y. 1820). Most courts now accept the 
notion that, despite the narrow constitutional 
language, double jeopardy bars multiple criminal 
prosecutions ana punishments for the same 
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^criminal offense regardless of the severity of the 
^offense and consequent punishment. Breed v. 
Jones,A21 U.S. 519,528,95 S. Ct. 1779,1785 
(1975). 
,,:The main opinion, however, goes far beyond 
what the United States Supreme Court has ever 
«aid about double jeopardy and holds that a civil 
sanction is subject to double jeopardy analysis if 
it is not solely remedial. The main opinion states 
that if the civil sanction has any punitive 
aspects, no matter how minor, double jeopardy 
applies. The main opinion misreads the 
Constitution and misapplies the holding of 
United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 109 S. 
Ct. 1892 (1989). 
In Halper, the Supreme Court expressly held 
as follows: 
We therefore hold that under the Double 
Jeopardy Clause a defendant who already 
has been punished in a criminal prosecution 
may not be subjected to an additional civil 
sanction to the extent that the second 
sanction may not fairly be characterized as 
remedial, but only as a deterrent or 
retribution. 
Id. at 448^9, 109 S. Ct. at 1902 (emphasis 
added). Therefore, if the civil sanction can be 
characterized as serving at least some remedial 
purpose, double jeopardy does not apply. Id.; 
accord Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 
U.S. , 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1945 (1994) 
(holding that double jeopardy applies only if 
"the sanction may not be fairly characterized as 
remedial, but only as a deterrent or 
retribution").1 
In the present case, section 58-37-13 provides 
for forfeiture, under certain enumerated 
circumstances, of property used to manufacture 
or transport controlled substances. This section 
is at least partially remedial in nature. In State 
v. 392 South 600 East, Nephi, Utah, 886 P.2d 
534, 541 (Utah 1994), the Utah Supreme Court 
stated that this section is also "punitive, at least 
in part." In so stating, the supreme court 
recognized that this section serves at least some 
remedial purpose. Id. (^forfeiture statutes 
historically have been understood as serving not 
simply remedial goals but also those of 
punishment and deterrence.'" (quoting Austin v. 
United States, U.S. , n.14, 113 S. Ct. 
2801, 2803 n.14 (1993)). 
Under Halpefs Fifth Amendment analysis, 
double jeopardy applies only when the statute in 
question is solely punitive in nature. Halper, 
490 U.S. 448-49, 109 S. Ct. 1902. By contrast, 
under Eighth Amendment analysis, the 
Excessive Fines Clause applies if the statute m 
question is merely partly punitive in nature. 
Austin, U.S. , 113 S. Ct. at 2806 
(holding that "[w]e need not exclude the 
possibility that a forfeiture serves remedial 
purposes to conclude that it is subject to the 
limitations of the Excessive Fines Clause. We, 
however, must determine that it can only be 
explained as serving in part to punish.") 
Therefore, the main opinion errs by concluding 
that double jeopardy applies to civil forfeiture 
under section 58-37-13. The main opinion 
compounds this error by importing Eighth 
Amendment principles into a Fifth Amendment 
analysis. 
The Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth 
Amendment is the protection available to 
criminal defendants against unreasonable civil 
forfeiture. See Austin, U.S. , 113 S. Ct. 
at 2803 (holding that Excessive Fines Clause 
applies to forfeitures of property used to 
manufacture or transport illegal drugs); 392 
South 600 East, Nephi, Utah, 886 P.2d at 
540-41 (same). Under the Eighth Amendment, 
there is no bright line test for determining when 
a forfeiture is constitutionally excessive. See 392 
South 600 East, Nephi, Utah, 886 P.2d at 541. 
Instead, trial courts are granted appropriate 
discretion to determine, under the specific facts 
of each case, when a civil forfeiture becomes 
constitutionally excessive. Id. 
Even if the proportionality analysis under the 
Eighth Amendment could be fairly imported into 
a double jeopardy case, the main opinion fails to 
afford the trial court the necessary discretion to 
decide the case. The United States Supreme 
Court has recognized the imprecise task of 
determining the punitive character of a civil 
sanction: 
We acknowledge that this inquiry will not 
be an exact pursuit. In our decided cases we 
have noted that the precise amount of the 
Government's damages and costs may prove 
to be difficult, if not impossible, to 
ascertain. . . . Similarly, it would be 
difficult if not impossible in many cases for 
a court to determine the precise doDar figure 
at which a civil sanction has accomplished 
its remedial purpose of making the 
Government whole, but beyond which the 
sanction takes on the quality of punishment. 
In other words, as we have observed . . . 
the process of affixing a sanction that 
compensates the Government for all its costs 
inevitably involves an element of rough 
justice. Our upholding reasonable liquidated 
damages clauses reflects this unavoidable 
imprecision. Similarly, we have recognized 
that in the o r d i n a r y c a s e 
fixed-penalty-plus-damages provisions can 
be said to do no more than make 
Government whole. 
Halper, 490 U.S. at 449, 109 S. Ct. at 1902. 
The Court indicated that it would continue to 
look with favor upon such reasonable liquidated 
damages clauses and "fixed-penalty-plus-
damages" provisions. The Court noted that it 
was the rare case where a fixed-penalty 
provision subjects an offender to a sanction 
overwhelmingly disproportionate to the 
damages. Id. 
The rule is one of reason: Where a 
defendant previously has sustained a 
criminal penalty and the civil penalty sought 
in the subsequent proceeding bears no 
rational relation to the goal of compensating 
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the Government for its loss, but rather 
appears to qualify as "punishment" in the 
plain meaning of the word, then the 
defendant is entitled to an accounting of the 
Government's damages and costs to 
determine if the penalty sought in fact 
constitutes a second punishment. 
Id. 109 S. Ct. at 1902. Because of the imprecise 
nature of this determination, the Court left 
individual determinations of when civil sanctions 
constitute punishment within the sound 
discretion of the trial court. 
We must leave to the trial court the 
discretion to determine on the basis of such 
an accounting the size of the civil sanction 
the Government may receive without 
crossing the line between remedy and 
punishment. 
Id. 
In the present case, the trial court concluded 
that 
the penalty suffered by the defendant in the 
forfeiture proceeding did not exceed what 
could reasonably be regarded as the 
equivalent compensation, for the state[']s 
loss, and the penalty is not entirely 
unrelated to the actual damages suffered. 
The forfeiture penalty assessed in the 
forfeiture action was not so disproportionate 
to the cost of investigating and prosecuting 
the defendant that it constitutes 
"punishment" rather than "rough remedial 
justice." 
The trial court therefore held that the seizure of 
defendant's vehicle did not constitute 
"punishment" in the constitutional sense. This 
determination by the trial court is entitled to 
significant deference. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 
449-50, 109 S. Ct. 1902. 
Recently, the Utah Supreme Court addressed 
the deference due a trial court in cases where 
the court is called upon to apply facts to the 
law. In State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 
1994), the supreme court held that trial courts 
are entitled to deference when applying facts to 
controlling law. Unless the trial court crosses an 
established legal boundary, we should not upset 
the court's determination of whether, under the 
specific facts of a given case, the value of 
property seized under section 58-37-13 is so 
disproportionate to the cost of investigation and 
prosecution to constitute "punishment." Id. 
The trial court in the instant case did not 
abuse its discretion in determining that the 
State's seizure of defendant's vehicle did not 
constitute "punishment." Therefore, even if 
double jeopardy applies in this case, the main 
opinion errs by substituting its judgment for that 
of the trial court. 
CONCLUSION 
Section 58-37-13 is not, as a matter of law, 
solely punitive. The Double Jeopardy Clause 
therefore should not even come into play. 
Because the protections of double jeopardy are 
not available to a defendant under section 
58-37-13, a defendant's redress is limited to the 
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth 
Amendment. In any event, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion by determining that the 
seizure of defendant's vehicle was roughly 
equivalent to the cost of prosecution and 
therefore was not "punishment" in the 
constitutional sense. 
I would therefore affirm the trial court's 
denial of defendant's motion to dismiss the 
criminal charge brought against him. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
1. Justice O'Conner, writing separately in Kurth 
Ranch, echoed the principle of Halper: "Our double 
jeopardy cases make clear that a civil sanction will be 
considered punishment to the extent that it serves only 
the purposes of retribution and deterrence, as opposed 
to furthering any nonpunitive objective." Kurth 
Ranch, U.S. , 114 S. Ct. at 1953. 
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